Skip to main content

From Tsentr to Union Shield, Russian fall exercises in 2019

MSTA-S SPGs mobilizing near the Ukrainian border


The Russian army loves it’s grandiose main exercises. Not only do they present a great venue for strategic signaling and shows of force, but they also allow Russia to test its mobilization, logistics, command and communication capabilities with a realistic amount of forces.

The this years main exercise Tsentr 2019 ( Center 2019), was announced last December. The exercise will have foreign components from following countries:
- China
- India
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Tajikistan
- Pakistan
- Uzbekistan

The largest foreign participant will be China. The PLA will send over 1600 men into Russia. The Chinese force will consist of mechanized infantry and air-force units. During the previous similar exercise, the Vostok 2018, the Chinese mechanized units operated withing the Russian formations, but it’s unknown how well the integration actually works and whether or not these composite units are actually capable of conducting demanding combat operations.

Based on the preliminary information from the Russian armed forces, the Tsentr19 will have two focus points. The first one is the co-operation in central Asia and the second one is the defense of the Russian assets in the Arctic region.

The two parts of the Tsentr 19 will most likely have very little interaction below the highest levels of the Russian command structure. But conducting them simultaneously does present the Russian high command with an opportunity to exercise controlling and supplying two theaters of operations at the same time.

Marines of the Pasific fleet received brand new T-80BV tanks just in time for the Tsentr19.


The operations in the Central Asia are expected to be a mix between basic level mechanized warfare and counter insurgency operations, mostly aimed at strengthening the ties between the participating countries. The Arctic branch on the other hand will be mostly an area denial exercise.

The real key benefit to Russia is the test of the mobilization and deployment of the participating troops from different regions ranging from Stavropol to Vladivostok. During the preparation phase of the last years Vostok 18, Russia dug out large numbers of older equipment like the T-62M:s and moved them across Russia to the Ukrainian border under the disguise of the exercise.

The Union Shield 2019 is a different kind of beast. 12 000 soldiers from the Russia’s most elite mechanized formations will be exercising with their Belorussian counterparts in the outskirts of Moscow. Russia has openly stated that the exercise will be held in Moscow in order for it to not look like a provocation or threat to its western neighbors.

The Tsentr19 mobilizes the Russian second and third tier echelons and after they are deployed, the heaviest hitting forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army will move out in full combat readiness in Union Shield 19. The combination of the Tsentr 19 and Union Shield 19 looks awfully lot like an invasion exercise.

While the set up of the exercises makes it somewhat unlikely that they will turn into anything nefarious, the trend of the Russian main exercises is still clearly visible: Preparation for a major ground war in Europe.

Contradicting these comforting measures, Russia has alarmed several brigades in the Western and Southern Military Districts for snap drills. These units are stationed in the regions surrounding Ukraine. These combined arms drills will contain unknown number of aviation assets.

Its also noteworthy that many of the Russian neighbors, despite the Russian reassurances, are holding sizable defense/readiness exercises at the same time as Tsentr19 is running.

by: Petri Mäkelä

ps. Here is my piece of the most threatening Russian exercise so far, the Zapad 2017.


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Russian Tanks 2022: Thicker and Blinder

  Since the all out invasion of Ukraine the Russian army has lost at least 1700 tanks. This has caused the Russian army some supply problems, when they are re-forming their mauled units. Fighting has also revealed the need for upgrades on most of the Russian tank designs. The most obvious issues with the existing Russian tank fleet are the insufficient armor protection, the lack of reverse mobility and the vulnerability of the automatic loaders and their ammunition carousels. Although the last one has gifted us the sport of Turret Throwing. T-72B obr 2022 tanks Very little can be done for the mobility with the limitations of the existing transmissions and the autoloaders can’t really be replaced with better designs or human loaders either. The armor part on the other hand can be improved during the activation and refurbishment of the deep stored Soviet-era tanks. The first new design that appeared in the battlefield was an upgraded T-72B3 with additional armo,r mimicking the T-90M layo

Quick guide to identifying the Russian tanks Part 1: Updated Dec. 2021

  As most of the western nations have reduced their inventories to a few or mostly one type of main battle tank model in their active inventories, the myriad of tank platforms and distinct versions employed by the Russian armed forces may feel overwhelming. Here is a quick guide to identifying Russian MBTs. When you come across an image (or the actual thing), follow the steps to identify it properly. Updated 15.12.2021: T-90 modifications Family of the tank Russian Armed Forces currently operates, or at least storage, the following tank platforms/families: -            T-55 (<2000 in storage) -            T-62 (2000 in storage) -            T-64 (2000 in storage) -            T-72 (2000 active duty, 8000 in storage) -            T-80 (2000 active duty, 5000 in storage) -            T-90 (350 active duty, 600  in storage) -            T-14 (20 in field testing) So how can you identify what type of a tank are you looking at? There are two features that can be used to distinguishing th

Russian Spring offensive 2023: Kyiv Take Two

Russian T-80U tanks stuck and abandoned in Ukraine in spring 2022   The spectacular Ukrainian victories during the 2022 forced the Russian army to the defensive. With the Russian retreat from Kharkiv and the areas north of the river Dnipro in Kherson, the focus of the fighting has returned to the Donbass. The Russian forces, with Wagner mercenaries and penal battalions doing the bulk of the fighting and dying, are trying to take Bakhmut in a battle that invokes parallels to the meat grinders of the Great war. The Ukrainian armed forces on the other hand are slowly making progress towards Kreminna. Despite the continuous rumors about a new massive round of mobilizations, the Russian army cannot sustain the present level of attrition indefinitely. By throwing enough men and material against the prepared Ukrainian positions manned by experienced and highly motivated defenders, Russians may be able to gain some localized breakthroughs. But even if the Russian mechanized forces are able to